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CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE COMPENSATION
PRINCIPLE FROM GROTIUS TO CALABRESI
FRANCESCO PARISI* & VINCY FON**
ABSTRACT
Calabresi often lamented that insufficient consideration had
been given in the legal and economic literature to the idea of distrib-
uting an accident loss among a faultless tortfeasor and an innocent
victim on the basis of the relative causal contributions of the parties
to the loss. This criterion of apportionment of liability, which Cala-
bresi calls "comparative causation, " is the subject of this Article. We
present a brief intellectual history of the principle of comparative cau-
sation and provide a positive economic model that explains the rise
and fall of this criterion of liability in historical and contemporary
societies. In order to identify the structural features of this standard,
we consider how a rule of comparative causation would perform in
the absence of other liability rules when applied as a general and sole
basis of liability. The positive economic model of comparative causa-
tion brings to light some interesting features of the rule, but also
unveils the limits of such criterion of liability with respect to the in-
duced activity and care levels. The Article then extends the economic
model to consider the workings of the comparative causation rule in
conjunction with negligence rules. The combined application of the
comparative causation and negligence rules induces the parties to
minimize their expected liability by moderating their activity level: a
combination of incentives that no known liability rule provides.
In an article published in 1965 in the Harvard Law Review, Cala-
bresi notes that, as the current tort system apportions liability based
on fault, it only deters those accidents that are caused through fault
and ignores the value of deterring accidents that are faultless.' Cala-
bresi suggests this could be cured by adopting a system of nonfault
liability that assesses the costs of accidents in activities according to
the involvement in the activity, irrespective of legal notions of fault.2
Calabresi further suggests that in part this may be addressed by divid-
ing the costs of an accident pro rata among the sub-activities in-
* Professor of Law & Director, Law and Economics Program, George Mason School
of Law.
** Assistant Professor, George Washington University, Department of Economics.1. Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs,
78 HAjv. L. REv. 713, 719-20 (1965).
2. Id. at 719.
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volved.3 For example, if a walker, a bicyclist, and an automobile are
all involved in an accident, the costs would be divided among these
three sub-activities.4 If this occurred in case after case, the cumulative
effect would be to assign greater liability to those activities that are
involved in more accidents (both numerically and in terms of
expense) .'
In The Costs of Accidents,6 Calabresi returns to this issue, and he
assesses the field of theory that endeavors to explain the modern
trend away from fault-based apportionment of liability. Because one
of the primary concerns of tort law is compensating the faultless vic-
tim, it may be seen as unjust to place liability completely on one
party.7 On a theoretical level, Calabresi states that "[t] he justification
found most often among legal writers today for allocation of accident
losses on a nonfault basis is that accident losses will be least burden-
some if they are spread broadly among people and over time."8
Since The Costs of Accidents, law and economics scholars have pro-
vided convincing rationales as to when it may be efficient to let some
losses rest where they fall (i.e., leaving the victim's loss uncompen-
sated), and when instead it may be efficient to shift the loss to the
tortfeasor. Under most liability rules, if neither party is at fault, the
loss is either entirely borne by the victim (as in a negligence-based
system) or is shifted entirely on the tortfeasor (as in a strict liability
system). Absent fault on either party, there are no legal rules de-
signed to apportion the loss between victim and tortfeasor.9 Yet, as
3. Id. at 740.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. GUIDO CAABREsi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970).
7. Id. at 5. Calabresi assesses five different reforms for the apportionment of liability
that strive to address this issue: (1) a form of general societal insurance that compensates
victims of accidents from general tax revenues; (2) first-party motorist insurance plans that
require each owner to protect himself from accidents; (3) increased emphasis on extensive
government safety regulations to prevent accidents; (4) a guaranteed benefits program
that favors a guaranteed payment in exchange for waiver of common-law remedies; and (5)
judicial expansion of products liability law. Id. at 5-14.
8. Id. at 39.
9. The sharing of the loss is generally pursued through rules of comparative negli-
gence whenever both parties have failed to meet their minimum standard of care in their
conduct. Cf Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal 87
YALE L.J. 697, 726-27 (1978) (describing comparative negligence as a liability-dividing rule
that eliminates the fairness and accident prevention problems inherent in the negligence
rule and contributory negligence). See generally Robert D. Cooter & Thomas S. Ulen, An
Economic Case for Comparative Negligence, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1067 (1986); Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
The Efficiency of Comparative Negligence, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 375 (1987).
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Calabresi' ° and Calabresi and Cooper lament, no consideration has
been given to the idea of distributing the loss between faultless parties
on the basis of their respective contribution to the loss.
In a 1996 article, Calabresi and Cooper explore the issue of loss
spreading among faultless parties in greater detail. 2 They chart an
evolutionary path of comparative causation issues in tort law. They
hypothesize that over the last thirty years the tort system began valuing
notions of comparative negligence over contributory negligence, and
while society is still far from embracing comparative causation, mod-
ern trends favor this idea. Summarizing these ideas, the authors write:
The integration of non-fault notions into the splitting analy-
sis under comparative negligence could ultimately lead us to
compare non-fault with non-fault-comparative non-negli-
gence, if you will. That is, there may be situations in which
neither side was negligent, but each side could have done
something to avoid the loss and did not. In these situations,
too, we might want to split the loss. But we are, in fact, no-
where near ready to do that yet, across the board. And so
where neither side is at fault, we still remain subject to all-or-
nothing rules. In the absence of defendant fault, innocent
plaintiffs bear the whole loss in most areas, while in so-called
non-fault liability areas, defendants bear the entire loss
where neither party is at fault. 3
The authors suggest that New York's adoption of comparative
negligence and abolishment of the doctrine of assumption of risk is
one manner in which the trend toward comparative causation could
be illustrated.14 In an area that had typically been subjected to strict
liability tempered by the assumption of risk (such as hazardous sub-
stances or products liability), there may be some desire to split the
damages among both faultless parties instead of having a legal rule in
place that puts the entire burden of loss on either the plaintiff or de-
fendant.15 The expansion of tort law into comparative causation
10. In his address at the Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Law & Economics
Association, Calabresi suggested comparative causation as a fertile field for research. In-
stead of determining who is at fault, the courts would assign liability to each party to the
degree that each party was the cause of the accident. Guido Calabresi, Address at the 6th
Annual Meeting of the American Law & Economics Association, Chicago (May 10-11,
1996).
11. Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey 0. Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REv.
859 (1996).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 877.




might take place by extending nonfault notions such as products lia-
bility and hazardous activities to cover a larger realm of incidents. 6
This expansion could be justified by arguing that it will not overly
burden defendants because, where strict liability rules shield plaintiffs
from carrying any burden of loss, comparative causation will require
plaintiffs to bear some of the burden in these cases.
17
Calabresi and Cooper then explore the consequences that adopt-
ing a rule of comparative causation might have for various areas of
tort law. For example, will there be a willingness to expand the idea
of proximate cause because the defendant's behavior, while remote in
time, still helped cause the accident?"8 Will there be a movement to
abandon the rule that recovery of emotional damages is an all-or-noth-
ing affair, depending on whether impact occurred? 9 How will the
idea of joint and several liability be altered? For example, under cur-
rent law, if Defendant A is ten percent negligent and Defendant B is
ninety percent negligent, but is judgment-proof, Defendant A could
be forced to pay the entire judgment.2 ° However, if the issue is re-
sponsibility and not negligence, is it still fair to obligate Defendant A
for the entire bill?21 If statistical causation is being used in a situation
where previously a plaintiff would be denied recovery if a defendant
was not more than fifty percent negligent, is there any rationale for
denying partial recovery when a defendant caused forty percent of the
risk?22
In this Article, we hope to add some insight on the functioning of
comparative causation. In Part I, we present a brief intellectual his-
tory of the comparative causation criterion, considering historical and
modern illustrations of the principle of compensation and its practical
corollary, the principle of comparative causation and causal appor-
tionment of the loss. In Part II, we look at the recent applications of
comparative causation in U.S. and foreign case law. In Part III, we
build on the results reached in the law and economics literature with
respect to the idea of sharing the loss among innocent parties. The
economic models of comparative causation bring to light some inter-
esting features of the rule. Specifically, we consider the application of
the comparative causation rule in conjunction with existing liability
16. Id. at 878.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 879.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 880-81.
22. Id at 882-83.
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rules based on negligence. The economic model of this rule allows us
to evaluate the advantages of the comparative causation principle, but
also to unveil the limits of this rule with respect to the incentives to
adopting efficient care and activity levels, for both tortfeasors and vic-
tims. In Part IV, we consider different approaches for the implemen-
tation of comparative causation. Part V concludes with some
considerations on the dilemma of casual apportionment of damages.
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF COMPARATiVE CAUSATION: AN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
2 3
The problem of apportioning losses between faultless parties is a
well-debated issue in legal theory. Fourteenth-century legal scholars
and fifteenth-century legal humanists were the first to consider explic-
itly the problem of apportioning losses among blameless parties.24 In
later times, seventeenth-century natural law scholars such as Hugo
Grotius25 and Samuel Pufendorf 26 critically revisited the Romanistic
principle of fault-according to which a tortfeasor is responsible for
the losses that he occasioned only if he is at fault 2 7-and they formu-
lated an alternative paradigm of liability known as the principle of
compensation. These scholars challenged the underlying assump-
tions of the fault principle by asking why a victim should bear the
losses occasioned by another, even when the victim is not at fault. The
tension between the fault principle and the compensation principle
became apparent in the jurisprudential writings of Grotius, who con-
sidered the practical implications of those alternative criteria of liabil-
ity in actual cases.
A. Grotius's Principle of Compensation
Grotius's work is suffused by an awareness that the faultiness of
an act must be considered independently from the consequences of
23. Part I draws from Francesco Parisi & Vincy Fon, Comparative Causation, 6 AM. L. &
ECON. REv. 345, 347-49 (2004), and FRANCESCO PARISI, LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE AND
JUDICIAL DISCRETION 147-48 (2d ed. 1992).
24. For a broader historical analysis of the evolution of these criteria of liability in
medieval Europe, see PARISI, supra note 23, at 25-136.
25. Huco GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Bobbs-Mer-
rill Co., Inc. 1925) (1625).
26. 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAF ET GENTIUM: LIBRI Ocro (C.H. Oldfather
& W.A. Oldfather trans., James Brown Scott ed., Oceana Publ'ns Inc. and Wildy & Sons
Ltd. 1964) (1688).
27. See GROTIUS, supra note 25, at 430 (defining "fault" as an action "whether of com-
mission or of omission, which is in conflict with what men ought to do, either from their
common interest or by reason of a special quality").
[VOL. 64:108
CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY
the act.28 Grotius proposes moving away from the fault principle by
adopting a compensation principle, suggesting that absent fault, there
is no reason to let the loss fall on the innocent victim, just like there is
no obvious reason to shift it to the tortfeasor.
29
In many ways, Grotius's work exemplifies the seventeenth-century
scholars' uneasiness with the existing paradigms of liability, an all-or-
nothing approach to the apportionment of liability. Even when dam-
ages cannot be apportioned on the basis of the relative fault of the
parties (such as when both parties were negligent and the loss is
spread on the basis of comparative negligence), equitable principles
may require the apportionment of the loss between the parties.
Among the scholars of his age, Grotius was probably the most explicit
and forceful advocate of the idea of equitable apportionment of dam-
ages. He argues that apportionment of liability should take place
even when neither party is negligent or if negligence cannot be
assessed.3 °
Grotius provides another example where someone's ship runs
afoul of another. He notes that according to the laws that were in
force at the time of his writings (i.e., prior to the year 1625), many
nations, including his own, divided the cost between both parties, due
to the difficulty of deciding who was at fault in such a case.31 In this
manner, some of the arbitrariness of the liability system could be
28. PARISI, supra note 23, at 145. Grotius separates "fault," defined supra note 27, from
liability. See GROTIUS, supra note 25, at 430 ("From such a fault, if damage has been caused,
by the law of nature an obligation arises, namely that the damage should be made good."
(footnote omitted)).
29. The criterion of causal apportionment of the loss was an important, and possibly
unavoidable, corollary of Grotius's equitable approach to liability. GROTIUS, supra note 25,
at 433. A passage of The Law of War and Peace examined the rationale of cases in which the
link between liability and faultiness was not clearly assessed. See id. at 434 (differentiating
between an unjustified homicide, in which one unjustly takes a human life and therefore
must compensate the dead man's family for what they have lost, and a situation in which
the person who took a life had the right to participate in the activity that resulted in death,
and thus faced no liability); see also PARISI, supra note 23, at 145-46 (noting that Grotius's
separation of liability from faultiness, which initially does not change the inquiry nor the
result in determining responsibility for a wrong done, has nevertheless been read as "intro-
ducing a general possibility of risk liability not based on fault").
30. GROTIUS, supra note 25, at 433.
31. As Grotius states:
This also is to be noted, that it is likewise a principle of municipal law that a slave
or animal, which has caused damage or loss, is to be delivered up for punishment.
For by the law of nature the owner who is not in fault is not in any degree liable.
Furthermore, he is not liable whose ship without fault on his part has caused
damage to the ship of another. Yet by the laws of many peoples, as also by our





avoided and compensation could be determined on the basis of objec-
tive criteria of causal contribution, rather than on the basis of subjec-
tive elements of fault.32 This criterion of causal imputability has
traditionally been understood as a way to provide the victim with equi-
table compensation for the harm suffered."3 At the same time, how-
ever, it can be viewed as an instrument responding to different policy
concerns, as the economic analysis of the rule will suggest.
B. The Rise and Fall of Comparative Causation in European Tort Law
In large part, the historical doctrines of comparative causation
discussed above did not leave much of a mark in the black-letter re-
statements of Western tort law. Although the natural lawyers of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries continued to approach the is-
sue of delictual liability in very much the same terms used by Grotius
and his predecessors, the specific equitable approach to tort liability
and damage assessment was not destined to be shared by later jurists,
such as Domat and Pothier, and was consequently ignored in the sub-
sequent codifications of tort principles in the civil-law tradition. 4 In
spite of these incursions into its development, the rules of civil liability
adopted in the nineteenth-century European codes continued to be
based solely on the classical principle of fault.3 5 Whoever by his own
fault caused damage to another was bound to compensate the other.
Lacking any fault, or evidence thereof, the loss was to lie where it fell
without any room for equitable adjustment or causal apportionment
of liability. 6
II. MODERN APPLICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
COMPARATIVE CAUSATION
The historical illustrations of causal apportionment of loss that
we have considered are not the only incarnations of the comparative
32. PARISI, supra note 23, at 147.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 147-50. For a discussion of Domat and Pothier's contribution to the first
codifications of tort law, see id. at 151-53.
35. Id. at 149, 154; e.g., C. civ. art. 1382 (1804) (French Civil Code of 1804); § 823(1)
BGB (1900) (German Civil Code, the Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch, of 1900). For extracts of
these codes, see F.H. LAWSON, NEGLIGENCE IN THE CIVIL LAW: INTRODUCTION AND SELEC-T
TEXTS 186, 203-04 (1950).
36. Due to the mixed intellectual heritage of the notion of fault, it is not surprising
that modern European codes chose not to include any definition of fault in the black-letter
law, and consciously or unconsciously left much room for equitable decisionmaking. See,
e.g., THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE, at xvi (Ian S. Forrester et al. trans., 1975) (characterizing
section 823(1) of the German Civil Code as an abstract statement of principle to be inter-
preted equitably by a court).
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causation rule. The modern applications of the rule are, however,
only partially germane to their historical antecedents. While the his-
torical articulations of the principle of comparative causation were
grounded on the ethical need to apportion the harm between an in-
nocent tortfeasor and an innocent victim, the recent revival of the
concept of comparative causation is driven by additional, more prag-
matic, necessities. In recent years, the rule of comparative causation
has emerged in the midst of established liability systems (based on
fault or strict liability) and has been applied to situations where it was
difficult to evaluate the parties' fault or where it was otherwise desira-
ble to apportion the loss between tortfeasor and victim on the basis of
criteria of causal imputability.
A. The Recent Revival of Comparative Causation in American Tort Law
In American tort law, the doctrine of comparative causation has
been revived for the assessment of the liability of the parties in situa-
tions where the traditional criterion of fault-based liability fails to offer
a viable standard of adjudication. The occasional applications of the
comparative causation rule have been met with mixed support by
commentators. On the one hand, courts and practitioners have noted
that "[i] t is time to move away from subjective considerations of fault
assessment which invariably change with the fact finder," and instead
adopt the "reliable concept of comparative causation."3 Others have
stressed the residual function of comparative causation; it should be
used only when other traditional criteria of liability are unavailable.38
According to this view:
Where we can base apportionment of damages on judgments
of comparative negligence without reference to causation,
there is no need to substitute the complicated task of com-
parative causation. Where, however, the standard of liability
denies us commensurable faults to compare, as in strict lia-
bility cases, we ought to apportion [the loss] on the basis of
causal weight. 9
The judicial applications of comparative causation clearly reflect these
ideological positions.
The application of the criterion of comparative causation is seen
most often in three groups of cases involving: (1) strict liability versus
37. William D. Grimley, Comparative Fault & Solidary Delictual Obligations: On Further
Consideration, 60 LA. L. REv. 513, 534 (2000).
38. E.g., Robert N. Strassfeld, Causal Comparisons, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 913, 949 (1992).
39. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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negligent conduct, (2) products liability versus misuse, and (3) non-
negligent conduct versus equity. These situations are examined in
turn and a sample of recent case law invoking the criterion of compar-
ative causation follows.
1. Strict Liability and Negligent Conduct.-In the first group of
cases, courts are turning to the historical "causal" bases of fault de-
fenses in strict liability. Vernon Palmer suggests that the "contrast be-
tween strict liability and the modern negligence notion relates not to
fault, but to judicial balancing-to the flexible calculus of negligence
versus the inelastic standard of strict liability. '40 Palmer further asserts
that "[w] e must recognize the possibility that strict liability is a sliding
scale and not an exact point of reference."4 Indeed, Palmer argues
that rather than relying on comparative fault, judges have increasingly
used comparative causation in order to apportion losses in strict liabil-
ity cases. 42 Along similar lines, Aaron Gershonowitz notes that this is
logical because "[t]he primary reason that the plaintiff's conduct
should be considered in products liability litigation is the unfairness
of requiring defendants, or society through the risk-spreading mecha-
nism, to pay for injuries caused by the plaintiffs wrongdoing."4"
In Howard v. Allstate Insurance Co.,4 4 a well-known Louisiana case,
the court applied comparative causation, in lieu of comparative fault,
to an issue of strict liability.45 In this case, the defendants, whose dog
bit a child, were liable irrespective of whether or not they were negli-
gent.46 The court nevertheless held that under the comparative cau-
sation principle, the causal effect of the plaintiffs conduct should be
compared with the defendants' non-negligent causal contribution to
the loss.4 7 The court therefore considered the nature of the parties'
conduct in conjunction with the causal relation between the conduct
and the resulting damages.48
This reasoning is consistent with a current attempt on the part ofjudges to find ways to apportion the loss between the parties, and to
merge the "victim's fault" defenses into new comparative doctrines.
40. Vernon Palmer, A General Theory of the Inner Structure of Strict Liability: Common Law,
Civil Law, and Comparative Law, 62 TUL. L. REv. 1303, 1354 (1988).
41. Id. at 1306.
42. Id. at 1333.
43. Aaron Gershonowitz, Comparative Causation as an Alternative to, Not a Part of Compar-
ative Fault in Strict Products Liability, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 483, 485 (1986).
44. 520 So. 2d 715 (La. 1988).
45. Id. at 719.
46. Id. at 717.




Some scholars have been very supportive of these new judicial trends.
Grimley notes that Howard in particular illustrates the shortcomings of
comparative fault and why a comparative causation approach should
be taken: because there was no actual conduct on the part of the dog's
owner for the court to review, there was no basis for comparing
fault.4 9 These difficulties were aggravated by the fact that the victim
was a child, whose fault could not easily be assessed.5° Where there is
no actual conduct on the part of the defendant, or when the plain-
tiff's fault cannot be assessed, the application of traditional compara-
tive negligence rules is impossible, and comparative causation
emerges as a viable candidate to apportion liability between the
parties.
2. Products Liability and Misuse.-A second group of applications
of the comparative causation criterion can be found in the area of
products liability. In strict products liability cases, courts have been
quite active in mitigating the manufacturer's liability when the acci-
dent was occasioned (or rendered more likely) by the consumer's mis-
use of the product.5 ' In these cases, when no comparative negligence
criterion can be invoked, courts have increasingly turned to the doc-
trine of comparative causation as a way to allocate losses between pro-
ducers and consumers. For instance, in a Third Circuit case, the court
distinguished comparative causation from comparative fault, and con-
cluded that the court's task in products liability cases is to compare
the causal conduct of each party.5" The court went on to note that, if
a defendant is found strictly liable for harm resulting from a defective
49. Grimley, supra note 37, at 520.
50. See Howard, 520 So. 2d at 719 (holding that the jury was clearly wrong to attribute
50% of the fault to an 11-year-old child with the mental ability of an 8- or 9-year-old).
51. See Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1139
(9th Cir. 1977) (holding that a defendant is strictly liable in an action in which harm is
caused by a defective product but that damages in such cases should be reduced propor-
tionally by the plaintiffs own contribution to the injury); Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
512 F.2d 276, 290 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that the trial court was correct in reducing
damages according to the extent to which the decedent was contributorily negligent in a
products liability action); Daly v. Gei.. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1168 (Cal. 1978) (not-
ing that, should California adopt comparative principles, plaintiffs' recovery would be re-
duced to the extent that the lack of reasonable care in some way contributed to his injury);
Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., 219 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Wis. 1974) (noting that the
defense of comparative negligence is available to apportion fault in products liability
cases). Pan-Alaska, Daly, and Powers are discussed further in Mary J. Davis, Individual and
Institutional Responsibility: A Vision for Comparative Fault in Products Liability, 39 VILL. L. REv.
281, 309 n.94 (1994).
52. Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 158 (3d Cir. 1979) (cited and discussed
in Davis, supra note 51).
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product, the jury should be instructed to reduce the award propor-
tionately by the plaintiffs causal contribution to his own injury.5 3
A similar approach was adopted in a Texas products liability case,
where the court noted that if a plaintiffs misuse of a defective product
was unforeseeable to the defendant but the harm is reasonably fore-
seeable to the plaintiff, a verdict for the plaintiff should be reduced
proportionately to the extent that the unforeseen use of the product
contributed to the actual loss.54 In this case, the traditional all-or-
nothing strict liability approach would result in a complete bar to
plaintiff s recovery.55 Applying comparative causation, however, the
damages were apportioned between the two parties.5 6 A producer will
have greater knowledge regarding the product's defects, and accord-
ingly, will know the ways in which the product might pose a threat,
about which the user is unaware or unable to become aware.5" Once
a consumer becomes aware of a defect, however, the producer and
consumer are on equal footing because they are equally knowledge-
able, and in this case, it was proper to compare their conduct
accordingly.58
3. Non-Negligent Conduct and Equitable Apportionment of the Loss.-
A third group of applications of the comparative causation criterion is
more germane to the historical applications of the rule, examined in
Part I. In this group of cases, courts have struggled to apportion the
loss among faultless parties on the basis of the causal contribution of
the parties' conduct to the actual loss.
In such contexts, courts have applied the concept of comparative
causation as an instrument for achieving the most equitable result,
when no other criterion of liability seemed to allow an apportionment
of the loss between the parties. In Gibson v. State ex rel. Department of
Transportation and Development,59 for example, the plaintiff was cross-
ing a bridge when his vehicle slid off of the highway onto an embank-
ment and impacted a bridge cap.6" The impact flipped the car and
53. Id. at 162.
54. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 352 (Tex. 1977).
55. See id. (concluding that "comparison and division of the causes [should not] be
confused with . . .modified comparative negligence which bars all recovery . . . if [the
plaintiff's] negligence is greater than [that of the defendant]").
56. Id.
57. See id. at 351. For a discussion of Hopkins, see Aaron D. Twerski, The Many Faces of
Misuse: An Inquiry into the Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L. REV. 403,
432-34 (1978).
58. For further analysis, see Davis, supra note 51, at 349-50.
59. 674 So. 2d 996 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
60. Id. at 999.
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set it on fire, causing the plaintiff's death.6" The court focused on
comparative causation, since it was likely that the vehicle would have
veered off the road regardless of whether the bridge cap had been
there.6 2 The presence of the bridge cap, however, increased the im-
pact and caused the fire, killing the driver.63 Therefore, the "court
came very close to assessing the deceased and the [defendant] with
precisely the harm that each caused."64
B. Causal Apportionment of Damages in Foreign Jurisdictions
Similar developments of the paradigm of comparative causation
can be found in some foreign civil-law jurisdictions. Such develop-
ments are very interesting in light of the greater constraints that civil-
law courts face when introducing new legal principles in established
areas of law, such as torts.
France and Germany adopted some causal apportionment stan-
dards in the 1800s, and current French jurisprudence continues to
reflect the growing causal basis for apportioning liability.65 In custo-
dial liability cases, for example, the French Cour de cassation applies all
liability defenses on a causal basis, and does not recognize the "fault"
of the victim in most circumstances. 66
The principle of comparative causation has reached beyond Eu-
rope. Japanese courts are committed to allocating equitably all dam-
ages in tort and contract cases. 67 Japanese courts exercise substantial
discretion in considering the individual circumstances of a particular
case to determine the liability of the defendant.6" The comparative
negligence doctrine and foreseeability standard is used by Japanese
courts in contract law when parties determine damages they owe each
other in cases of breach (despite the clear determination by the draft-
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1003.
63. See id. at 1005 (characterizing the accident as initially minor but made fatal by the
location of the bridge cap).
64. Grimley, supra note 37, at 524-25. The same results could have been reached in
this case by thinking of the facts as constituting, in essence, two different accidents. Id. at
525.
65. Parisi & Fon, supra note 23, at 349; see also Palmer, supra note 40, at 1327, 1333;
Robert A. Prentice, Can the Contributory Negligence Defense Contribute to a Defusing of the Ac-
countants'Liability Crisis?, 13 Wis. INT'L L.J. 359, 366 n.4 (1998).
66. Palmer, supra note 40, at 1333. Palmer further notes that "[t]his narrowed causal
basis illustrates that defenses provide a separate source of strictness in the field of strict
liability." Id, at 1333-34.
67. Li Yu, Book Review, 6 COLUM. J. EUR. LAw 147, 148 (2000) (reviewing MODERN
TRENDS IN TORT LAW: DUTCH AND JAPANESE LAW COMPARED (Ewoud Hondius ed., 1999)).
68. Y. Nomi, Proportionality in Tort and Contract Law, in MODERN TRENDS IN TORT LAw:
DUTCH AND JAPANESE LAw COMPARED, supra note 67, at 209, 215; Yu, supra note 67, at 148.
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ers of the Japanese Civil Code that stipulated damages may not be
reduced by comparative causation).69 In torts, whenever traditional
criteria of liability lead to all-or-nothing outcomes, the demand for
equitable apportionment of damages has allowed Japanese courts to
apportion damages using a causal basis.7" Further, this judicial discre-
tion has provided a pragmatically viable solution to mass toxic tort
cases. For instance, in a case where there was an unclear causal con-
nection between the defendant's poisoning and resulting illness, a
Japanese court resolved the dispute over causation by linking the ex-
tent of compensation to a plaintiffs position on a grid representing
the likelihood of industrial pollution being the cause for her illness.71
Compensation was adjusted accordingly.72
Legal developments in Europe have also focused on this criterion
of liability in the field of environmental law.7" The Hoge Raad, the
Supreme Court of the Netherlands, applied negligence and compara-
tive causation principles to a series of cases involving environmental
liability in the 1980s. TM European states are increasingly likely to apply
public-law solutions and to compare causation, rather than simply en-
able individuals to recover through traditional liability doctrines that
would force an all-or-nothing solution with no intermediate levels of
recovery.75 Both the law of the European Union and public interna-
tional law follow a similar approach. For example, in a case before the
European Court ofJustice, in which the plaintiff sued the Commission
of the European Communities for his wrongful arrest, the court held
that "[i]n assessing the conduct of the Commission on the one hand
and that of the applicant on the other, the Court considers it equita-
ble to apportion responsibility for that damage equally between the
two parties. 76 Rules of public international law dealing with the inter-
national liability of sovereign states present features that closely re-
semble those of the seventeenth-century maritime law discussed by
Grotius. For example, in international law, the liability of nations is
69. Nomi, supra note 68, at 218-19.
70. Yu, supra note 67, at 148; see also Nomi, supra note 68, at 210 (noting thatJapanese
courts apply comparative negligence very widely in order to achieve equity).
71. Nomi, supra note 68, at 213-14; Yu, supra note 67, at 148.
72. Nomi, supra note 68, at 214; see also Yu, supra note 67, at 148 (stating that the
demand for equity has enabled Japanese courts to reach efficient economic resolutions of
massive toxic tort cases).
73. Parisi & Fon, supra note 23, at 349.
74. Id.; Yu, supra note 67, at 149.
75. Yu, supra note 67, at 149-50.




governed by a rule of equitable apportionment of the loss between the
parties.77
The use of such an approach in cases concerning the responsibil-
ity of states is justified by the pragmatic need to provide "satisfaction"
to the victim state, making it appropriate to "prescribe the payment of
compensation for the consequences of legal or 'excusable' acts.
'
"78
Diplomatic expediency often requires an apportionment of the loss
between states in order to maintain good standards in international
relations and to uphold effectively the principle of reparation. 9
In spite of the different pragmatic reasons for adopting the com-
parative causation rule, the historical and comparative illustrations
considered above share a common methodological foundation, based
on the causal apportionment of the loss.
III. APPLYING COMPARATIVE CAUSATION UNDER NEGLIGENCE
Comparative causation historically emerges in the midst of legal
systems based on negligence, in response to the rise of the compensa-
tion principle, which suggests that, absent fault, there is no reason to let
the loss fall on the innocent victim, just as there is no obvious reason
to shift it onto the tortfeasor.8 ° The rule first emerged in legal systems
of the civil-law tradition that already had embraced the criterion of
comparative negligence for apportioning liability among negligent
parties.8' In those early applications, the comparative causation rule
was invoked in bilateral precaution situations, coexisting with a gen-
eral regime of negligence with a defense of comparative negligence.
The original formulations of the principle of compensation advocated
the criterion of causal apportionment of the loss only when neither
the tortfeasor nor the victim was found negligent.82 In those original
formulations, the principle of comparative causation thus only oper-
ated as a residual basis of liability in order to avoid the all-or-nothing
77. In addition to the applications of the comparative causation principle in maritime
law, Grotius's principle was taken seriously by some legal systems, which considered his
work as highly authoritative. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw
434 (4th ed., 1990) (stating that the concepts of reparation and restitution have long been
a part of legal concepts in Europe and classical writers such as Grotius often referred to
these concepts).
78. Id. at 433.
79. For a general discussion of the different conceptions of satisfaction, reparation,
and compensation in international law, see id. at 457-65.
80. Parisi & Fon, supra note 23, at 34748.
81. Id. at 359 n.22. In fact, the civil-law tradition utilized a comparative negligence rule
much earlier than the common law. Id.
82. Id. at 359.
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allocation of liability generated by the traditional rules in the case of
faultless parties. s3
The economic model of comparative causation that we developed
in an earlier article sheds light on the workings of comparative causa-
tion rules in historical legal systems. s4 The mixed fortunes and the
changing contours of the comparative causation rule are also best un-
derstood in light of such an economic model.s5 In this Part we will
consider the mechanics of the criterion of comparative causation ap-
plied in combination with negligence and comparative negligence
rules.
A. Missing Thresholds and the Troublesome Design of Loss-Sharing Rules
In order for a party to choose the optimal activity level, he must
bear the full accident costs in equilibrium. From a practical stand-
point, however, there are no existing legal rules based on the activity
level of the parties that threaten full liability for both parties in equi-
librium.8 6 The problem can be understood by comparing the bilat-
eral precaution rules based on level of care (e.g., comparative
negligence) to other bilateral rules based on activity level (e.g., com-
parative causation).7 In care-based regimes, there is a critical (or
threshold) value of care (generally defined as the socially efficient
88 sclevel of care), which separates negligence from diligence. No such
critical value can be identified in the case of activity level.
The reason why it is not feasible to specify a socially optimal activ-
ity level (one that could operate as a judicially applied threshold for
the assessment of liability) is quite straightforward. Efficient activity
levels can only be determined with information regarding the subjec-
83. Id. When neither party is at fault, the criterion of comparative negligence does not
allow loss spreading between the parties. Id. at 348. In such a scenario, under a strict
liability rule the entire loss would be borne by the tortfeasor, while under a negligence
rule, the loss would be borne entirely by the victim. Id. at 365.
84. See id. at 350-65 (discussing a model to highlight the essence of comparative
causation).
85. Id. at 364.
86. See id. at 359 (noting that no threshold of "optimal activity level" is generally in-
voked by legal rules as a liability mechanism). As it has been pointed out in the literature,
if the due standard of efficient behavior for injurers and victims could also be formulated
with respect to optimal activity levels, then liability rules could induce optimal care and
activity levels for both parties. Id. at 359 n.24 (citing THOMASJ. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE
LAw: TORTS, CONTRACTS, PROPERTY, LITIGATION 29 (1997)). The historical emergence of
rules of comparative causation partially reflects the difficulties of implementing such an
ideal rule. Id.
87. See id. at 359 (introducing the difficulty inherent in combining comparative causa-
tion with fault-based liability, i.e., comparative causation under negligence).
88. Id.
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tive value of the activity for the parties." Unlike optimal levels of
care, which depend solely on the objective cost of precaution and the
expected gravity of the harm, optimal activity levels rely on values that
are unascertainable by a third-party decisionmaker, since they include
the subjective surplus of the individual that carries out the risk-creat-
ing (or risk-bearing) activity."° In the absence of an objective thresh-
old for activity level, there is no way to identify a critical value of
activity level beyond which individuals could be deemed to have acted
inappropriately.
9 1
The comparative causation criterion avoids the need to identify
such a critical value, since it creates no point of discontinuity in the
liability curve faced by the parties.92 Furthermore, it induces both
parties to internalize positive shares of the social cost of activity and
social benefits of care in equilibrium. 93 In equilibrium, parties are
induced to adopt efficient activity levels, thereby avoiding the need for
a third-party evaluation of unobservable costs and benefits. 4
89. Id. at 360.
90. Id. This difficulty is also evident in the mathematical formulation of the activity
level problem. Unlike level of care problems, generally modeled as minimization
problems, the analysis of care-plus-activity situations is generally reformulated as a max-
imization problem. This is due to the need to take into account the private (and social)
value of the activity level. If the problem were formulated as a mere cost minimization
problem, the optimal activity level would paradoxically always be zero. Corner solutions of
this sort would obviously be generally undesirable, given the private and social value of risk-
creating activities. Id. at 360 n.26.
91. Without specifying a threshold activity level, it will be impossible to give both par-
ties incentives to choose efficient activity levels in equilibrium. Id. at 360. As Thomas
Miceli suggests, "[t]he usual reason given for making negligence conditional only on care
is that the task of calculating optimal activity levels is prohibitively costly for courts to un-
dertake." MICELI, supra note 86, at 28 (citing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 66-67 (1987)). Landes & Posner further suggest,
however, that as a matter of practice, courts take into account activity levels in their assess-
ment of negligence in the case at bar, whenever it is feasible to do so. LANDES & POSNER,
supra, at 70-71; see also Stephen G. Gilles, Rule-Based Negligence and the Regulation of Activity
Levels, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 327-37 (1992).
92. In this respect, the comparative causation rule has been analogized to a "compara-
tive strict liability" rule. Parisi & Fon, supra note 23, at 350 n.7; see also Francesco Parisi &
Giampaolo Frezza, La Responsabilitd Stocastica, 63 REsPONSABILITA CIVILE E PREVIDENZA 824
(1998).
93. Cf MICELI, supra note 86, at 19, 28-29 (noting that under a regime where damages
are paid by either one party or another, only one party can be induced to choose the
optimal activity while both will choose optimal care).
94. Although the simple formulation of the comparative causation rule induces less
than optimal incentives on all margins (i.e., both the care level and activity level for each of
the two parties: x, y, z, and u) it nevertheless already constitutes an improvement with
respect to all known liability rules for at least one of the four variables mentioned above.
Cf id.
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B. The Comparative Causation Regime Versus Other Regimes
With the help of an example, we will discuss the strength of the
comparative causation criterion.95 This criterion will be compared to
two important criteria discussed in the literature: strict liability with
contributory negligence and negligence with contributory negligence.
These two criteria will be the benchmark against which we discuss the
comparative causation criterion.
Our example starts with Table 1. We consider a framework of
comparative causation where loss sharing occurs only when there is no
unilateral negligence (i.e., when neither party is at fault or when both
parties are at fault). For the example to be tractable, we assume that
both the injurer (1) and the victim (V) adopt the optimal amount of
care and only concentrate on their choices of activity levels. 6 Col-
umns 1 and 2 (CI and C2) indicate that either party can choose high,
moderate, or low levels of activity. C3 shows the injurer's benefit (B1)
for adopting different levels of activity. In particular, the injurer's net
benefit increases from 11 to 13 to 14 when the activity level increases
from low to moderate to high. Note that the marginal benefit of in-
creasing activity level decreases from 2 to 1. Likewise, the benefits of
the victim (Bv) in adopting different levels of activity are given in C4,
where marginal benefit decreases with increasing activity level. C5
provides the total accident loss (L)." C6 shows the social welfare (W),
where social welfare is the sum of the benefits of the injurer and the
victim minus the accident loss (C6 = C3 + C4 - C5).
From C6, observe that social welfare is maximized at Row 8 (R8 in
Table 1). That is, when the activity levels for the injurer and the vic-
tim are a, = low and av = moderate, social welfare is maximized at W =
21.
Now consider what happens under strict liability with contribu-
tory negligence. The injurer can avoid liability if the victim is negli-
gent. If the victim is not negligent, the injurer is fully liable. It is our
assumption that the victim adopts the optimal amount of care. Since
95. The criterion discussed here is the criterion of comparative causation under negli-
gence discussed in Parisi & Fon, supra note 23, at 358-65.
96. Loss sharing in case of bilateral negligence would be similar to the allocation of a
loss under comparative negligence. The qualitative results would not differ from the tradi-
tional analysis.
97. This example is generated by using the following values. When the injurer's activ-
ity levels (a,) are high, moderate, or low, the corresponding imputed numerical values are
4, 3, and 2, respectively. Similarly, when the victim's activity levels (av) are high, moderate,
or low, the corresponding imputed numerical values are 3, 2, and 1.5. The total accident
loss is computed as twice the product of the imputed activity values for the injurer and the




ci C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8
Strict Liability with Negligence with
/'s Vs Total Contributory Contributory
Activity Activity Fs Vs Accident Social Negligence: /'s Negligence: Vs
Level Level Benefit Benefit Loss Welfare Net Benefit Net Benefit
a, a. B, Bv L W NB
L  NBvN
RI High High 14 19 24 9 -10 -5
R2 High Moderate 14 18 16 16 -2 2
R3 High Low .14 13 12 15 2 1
R4 Moderate High 13 19 18 14 -5 1
R5 Moderate Moderate 13 18 12 19 1 6
R6 Moderate Low 13 13 9 17 4 4
R7 Low High 11 19 12 18 -1 7
R8 Low Moderate 11 18 8 21 3 10
R9 Low Low 11 13 6 18 5 7
the victim does not have to bear the loss of the accident, he only con-
siders the benefit of his activities (C4) and chooses a high level of
activity: avL = high. The injurer knows that he is liable for the acci-
dent; he considers the net benefit incurred under the regime of strict
liability with contributory negligence. These net benefits are given by
the direct benefits derived from his activities less the accident loss,
and are presented in C7 (C7 = C3 - C5). Whatever activity level the
victim chooses, the injurer finds that his net benefit is generally high-
est by adopting a low level of activity: a1l = low. In particular, given
that the victim chooses the high level of activity, the injurer adopts a
low level of activity. Thus, under the regime of strict liability with con-
tributory negligence, the activity levels are alL = low and avL = high
(R7). The social welfare is WL = 18 (R7, C6), which is less than opti-
mal. Further, in this case, the net benefit to the injurer is -1 and the
benefit to the victim is 19.
Next consider what happens under negligence with contributory
negligence. The injurer can avoid liability if the injurer is not negli-
gent or if the victim is contributorily negligent. Our assumption is
that both the injurer and the victim adopt the optimal amount of
care. As the injurer is not negligent, the victim is liable for the acci-
dent loss. Since the injurer does not have to bear the loss of the acci-
dent, he only considers the benefit of his activities (C3) and chooses a
high level of activity: aiL = high. The victim knows that he is liable for
the accident, so he takes the accident loss into account and considers
the net benefit incurred under the regime of negligence with contrib-
utory negligence. These net benefits are given by his benefit derived
from his activities minus the accident loss and are presented in C8 (C8
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= C4 - C5). Whatever activity level the injurer chooses, the victim finds
that his net benefit is highest by adopting a moderate level of activity:
avL = moderate. In particular, given that the injurer chooses the high
level of activity, the victim adopts a moderate level of activity. Thus,
under the regime of negligence with contributory negligence, the ac-
tivity levels are aL = high and avE = moderate (R2). The social welfare
is WN = 16 (R2, C6), from which a benefit of 14 is enjoyed by the
injurer and a net benefit of 2 is enjoyed by the victim.
Note that under the regime of strict liability with contributory
negligence and the regime of negligence with contributory negli-
gence, there are losses in social welfare.98 We now turn our attention
to the regime of comparative causation. Under our criterion of com-
parative causation, the two parties share the accident loss when both
parties are negligent or when neither party is negligent. Thus, the all-
or-nothing allocations of liability remain applicable when only one
party is negligent. To continue with our numerical example, we as-
sume that the share of the damages paid by each party depends on the
activity levels of both parties. In particular, given the other party's
activity level, one party has to pay a higher share of the accident loss if
his activity level is higher. We impute a value for the activity level of
each party and then compute the share of the accident cost borne by
each party from these imputed activity values. The net benefits in-
curred for the injurer and the victim under this regime are presented
in C9 and CIO in Table 2." The first few columns in Table 2 (CI
through C6) are the same as those columns in Table 1. Note that for
each row, the sum of the net benefit to the injurer NBc and the net
benefit to the victim NBvc is equal to the social welfare W (i.e., C9 +
C10 = C6).
Consider the behavior of the injurer under this regime. Assum-
ing that the victim chooses the high level of activity, the injurer com-
pares his net benefits when he chooses a high level of activity (0.29 in
R1, C9), when he chooses a moderate level of activity (4 in R4, C9),
and when he chooses a low level of activity (6.20 in R7, C9). He de-
98. Recall that the maximum social welfare in C6 is 21 (R8). However, under the re-
gime of strict liability with contributory negligence, the social welfare is 18 (R7); there is a
welfare loss of 3. Likewise, under the regime of negligence with contributory negligence,
the social welfare is 16 (R2) and the welfare loss is 5.
99. For example, when the injurer chooses a high level of activity (a, = 4) and the
victim also adopts a high level of activity (av = 3), the share of the damage borne by the
injurer is equal to 4/7 times the loss. The net benefit of the injurer is then equal to his
benefit from engaging in the activity (C3) minus his share of the damage. In general, the
net benefit for the injurer is NB1c = B, - (a, /(a, + av))*L. Likewise, the net benefit for the




Cl C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C9 CIO
rs Vs Total Comparative Comparative
Activity Activity /s Vs Accident Social Causation: !'s Causation: Vs
Level Level Benefit Benefit Loss Welfare Net Benefit Net Benefit
a, a. BI Bv L W NB
c  NBvc
RI High High 14 19 24 9 .29 8.71
R2 High Moderate 14 18 16 16 3.33 12.67
R3 High Low 14 13 12 15 5.27 9.73
R4 Moderate High 13 19 18 14 4 10
R5 Moderate Moderate 13 18 12 19 5.8 13.2
R6 Moderate Low 13 13 9 17 7 10
R7 Low High 11 19 12 18 6.2 11.8
R8 Low Moderate 11 18 8 21 7 14
R9 Low Low 11 13 6 18 7.57 10.43
cides to adopt a low level of activity since his net benefit is highest.
Likewise, assuming that the victim chooses a moderate level of activity,
the injurer chooses a low level of activity since his payoff is highest at 7
(the payoff in R8 is higher than the payoffs in R5 and R2). Lastly,
when the victim chooses a low level of activity, the injurer still finds
that choosing a low level of activity is his best strategy. Thus, the in-
jurer chooses the low level of activity whatever the choice of the vic-
tim: aic = low.
Similar consideration shows that the victim is best off choosing
the moderate level of activity independent of the level of activity cho-
sen by the injurer. Thus, avC = moderate. Note that these activity
levels adopted by the two parties are efficient. Given these activity
levels, the social welfare is maximized at We = 21. In this case, the net
benefit to the injurer is 7 and the net benefit to the victim is 14.
Table 3 concludes the comparisons among the different regimes.
Our example shows that under the regime of comparative causation,
social welfare can be improved when compared to the regime of strict





's Activity Vs Activity Social Ts Net Vs Net
Level Level Welfare Benefit Benefit
Social Optimum Low Moderate 21 n/a n/a 1 00
Strict Liability with Contributory
Negligence Low High 18 -1 19
Negligence with Contributory
Negligence High Moderate 16 14 2
Comparative Causation Low Moderate 21 7 14
C. The Efficiency of Comparative Causation
These previous results provide us with a key for understanding
the evolution of comparative causation in the legal systems we have
considered.
If applied in conjunction with traditional negligence rules, causal
liability induces the parties to minimize their expected liability by
moderating their activity level. No other liability rule provides this
incentive. Obviously, the creation of such an incentive comes at a
cost, given that the application of causal liability requires the adjudica-
tion of cases even in situations where neither party is at fault. This will
likely increase the administrative costs of the liability system (at least
in those situations where the cases would not be brought to court ab-
sent an indicium of the parties' negligence).
In retrospect, we can therefore understand why the early applica-
tions of this rule took place in situations involving substantial losses(e.g., the cases of excusable homicide or ship collision found in the
seventeenth century). Likewise, we can understand why the rule has
continued to thrive in areas of the law where the benefits that could
be obtained from the improved activity level of the parties could jus-
tify the increase in adjudication costs (e.g., environmental cases), or,
alternatively, where the moderated form of liability produced by the
rule was necessitated by concerns of equity or political necessity (e.g.,
international responsibility of sovereign states).
The above considerations further reveal a qualitative difference
between the results of comparative causation and those generated by
the other conventional rules. Unlike all the other bilateral precaution
rules that concentrate on the incentives to optimize activity levels for
only one party, comparative causation rules spread the threat of
residual liability, and the resulting incentives, to both parties. Both
100. The social optimum criterion utilized in this Article does not tell us how the net
benefits should be allocated between the parties.
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victims and tortfeasors face some partial incentives to contain their
respective activity levels. The aggregate reduction of activity levels for
both victim and tortfeasor necessarily depends on the parties' cost and
benefit functions. Further research should verify whether a rule of
comparative causation under negligence could induce a greater over-
all reduction of "inefficient" activity levels, compared to traditional lia-
bility rules. Another important factor to consider in evaluating the
relative effectiveness of alternative liability rules is likely found in the
possible returns to scale and the synergies and complementarities of
activity level reduction by the two parties. Once again it is important
to bear in mind that, unlike other tort rules, comparative causation
spreads the incentives for activity control between both parties. The
desirability, or lack thereof, of spreading such incentives depends on
the relationship between the parties' efforts.
IV. APPLYING COMPARATIVE CAUSATION
The actual tort cases that have utilized the criterion of compara-
tive causation reveal that there is very little agreement among courts-
and even judges within the same court-on how comparative causa-
tion should be implemented. In Howard v. Allstate Insurance Co., the
majority opinion compared the causal contributions of both par-
ties.1" 1 The dissent, however, stated that causation is "absolute" and
"incapable of being divided into comparative degrees.""0 2 While most
courts agree that comparative causation is a more "precise" term than
comparative fault, this is where the agreement ends.103 In a Ninth
Circuit case, the court even stated that "perhaps the term 'compara-
tive causation' is a conceptually more precise term than 'comparative
fault."' 104 The court further stressed the importance of comparative
causation for an equitable apportionment of the loss, and noted a sim-
101. 520 So. 2d 715, 719 (La. 1988).
102. Id. at 720 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
103. Likewise, some scholars suggest that from a juror's standpoint, it would be much
simpler to use his intuitive and cognitive abilities to decide issues of relative fault than to
try to instruct him in the use of defense doctrines such as contributory or comparative
negligence, or assumption of risk. Matthew J. Moore, Missouri, The State of Confusion for
Comparative Fault in Strict Liability Contexts, 64 U.M.K.C. L. Rsv. 759, 784-85 (1996).
104. Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1139 (9th
Cir. 1977) (citation omitted); see also Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 159 (3d Cir.
1979) ("We agree with the Ninth Circuit when it noted that comparative causation is a
conceptually more precise term than comparative fault since fault alone without causation
does not subject one to liability." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Chotin Transp., Inc. v. United States, 819 F.2d 1342, 1353 n.1 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting




ilarity of purpose between the rules of comparative negligence and
those of comparative causation, in that they both seek "to achieve an
equitable method of allocating the responsibility for an injury or
loss."15 Commentators, too, have stressed the usefulness of this ap-
proach, and argued that a causal approach for allocating liability is a
viable alternative to traditional methods. 0 6
In spite of the consensus on the relevance of this criterion, the
implementation of a rule of comparative causation still lacks a solid
framework for assessing relative causation. Scholars and courts have
propounded a wide array of comparative causation approaches, which
can be tentatively grouped under two general headings:
(a) Pure causal approaches, based solely on the evaluation of ob-
servable proxies of causation such as activity levels or statistical dan-
gerousness of the activity.
(b) Mixed normative approaches where the estimated causal co-
efficients are "weighted" in consideration of extra-causal notions and
value judgments.
We shall briefly examine these two approaches in turn.
A. Pure Causal Approaches
In the first group of applications, there is an attempt to allocate
liability on the sole basis of the causal contribution of the parties' ac-
tivities to the loss. Since causation cannot be directly observed, prox-
ies (such as activity levels, statistical evaluation of dangerousness, and
"causal potency" of the activity) are utilized. The advantages of utiliz-
ing the pure causal approach are due to the fact that the criterion
avoids contaminating the causal test with extra-causal criteria, such as
fault. 0 7 William Grimley advocates such a pure application of the
comparative causation standard, observing that comparative causation
should not grade conduct by declaring that one party's conduct is
"more negligent" than another's and consequently assessing greater
causal contribution to the former than the latter.' Under a compar-
ative causation test, the focus should be on the consequences the con-
105. Pan-Alaska, 565 F.2d at 1139.
106. See Strassfeld, supra note 38, at 949 (observing that if we banish all talk of relative
causal importance we deny ourselves the possibility of making many causal comparisons).
107. See Grimley, supra note 37, at 515 (observing that allocation of fault is influenced by
subjective considerations that vary with the individual and result in inconsistent and unpre-
dictable outcomes).
108. Id. at 514.
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duct produces, as assessed through an objective evaluation of the
causal connection, independent of other value judgments.1"9
A comparative causation rule would generally consider the causal
potency of different actions or potential sources of the harm with
knowledge of how events unfolded. The comparative evaluation of a
causal link is, in this respect, not qualitatively more complex than the
comparative evaluation of negligence.11 ° Absent information about
actual causation, the application of comparative causation rules in
such a purely causal framework often rests on probabilistic informa-
tion alone (e.g., the likely incidence of a given course of conduct on
the probability of an accident)."1
In Part III of this Article, we studied the effects of a comparative
causation criterion of liability on the incentives of the parties. For the
purpose of our analysis, we considered the simplest concept of causal
incidence: one where the causal contribution of the parties' actions is
evaluated on the basis of the parties' activity level (i.e., extent to which
their risk-creating activity is carried out). This simple formulation as-
sumes that there is a positive and linear correlation between the activ-
ity level and the resulting aggregate level of risk created by an activity.
For many practical purposes, the apportionment of liability according
109. Id.
110. Our study concentrates on the incentive effects of the comparative causation rule,
assuming the practical viability of such an approach. Scholars have considered the prob-
lem and formulated practical frameworks for the comparative ascertainment of causation.
For example, RAYMOND MARTIN, THE PAST WITHIN Us: AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO PHILOSO-
PHY OF HIsTORY 78 (1989), ascertains comparative causation by considering the following
elements at the time of the event:
[An event] A was a more important cause of P relative to 0 than was B if:
(1) A and B were each a cause of P relative to 0, and
(2) either A was necessary for P or B was not necessary for P, and
(3) had B not occurred, something would have occurred which more closely ap-
proximates P than had A not occurred.
Id. In this study we will not dwell on the intricacies of the alternative approaches. For
further analysis, see JUDEA PEARL, CAUSAIrTv: MODELS, REASONING, AND INFERENCE (2000).
111. For an extensive study, showing the various approaches for the identification of
causal contributions to an event, see PEARL, supra note 110, ch. 3. Strassfeld notes, how-
ever, that this approach needs evidence such as scientific law, and statistical, historical, and
psychological generalizations that will be necessary for Martin's analysis to carry through.
Strassfeld, supra note 38, at 936. In other words, the comparative causation analysis re-
quires evidence regarding either the divisibility of the harm suffered, or the availability of
substitutes for one or more of the causes. Where the causes are apparent and the harm is
cumulative, it is easy to apportion liability on the amount of pollution, or another factor to
which each cause contributed. Strassfeld finds that this approach makes it a coherent and
practical analysis, allowing the court to consider the causes of each impact independently,
facilitating a more workable comparison. Id. at 944. Finally, it is intuitive that one cause's
importance is related to the contribution or the impact it has had. Id.
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to such a functional relationship bears similarities with the market
share liability utilized in recent case law."12
More complex formulations could be adopted (e.g., one where
the activity level is weighted according to the intrinsic causal potency
of the activity or where risk increases nonlinearly with activity levels,
etc.). Our simple formulation, however, is fairly transparent, and can
easily be utilized to study the more complex variations (e.g., multiply-
ing the activity levels by a coefficient representing the causal potency
or dangerousness of the activity, or adding exponents to capture possi-
ble nonlinearities).
B. Mixed Normative Approaches
The mixed normative approach applies the comparative causa-
tion rule in conjunction with extra-causal criteria of imputability. This
often amounts to a causal "weighing" of different sources of the harm.
There are various strands of mixed formulation, accounting for the
various factors that contribute to the causation of an accident, includ-
ing level of negligence of the parties, value judgments on the parties'
foresight and subjective information, and other relevant elements of
the tortious action.
These mixed approaches are advocated on the basis of the fact
that in the real world, the causal contribution to an accident is af-
fected by various factors, including the level of care and activity level
of the parties and other random variables."' In this context, some
authors suggest that the mixed approach is unavoidable in practice,
since we cannot make a case on purely causal grounds for assigning
greater causal weight to occasioning causes, or to later-in-time causes
that actualize the risk inherently created by the earlier events.' 14 Ac-
cording to this view, the comparison between concurring (or sequen-
tial) causes must necessarily "rest on normative extra-causal notions of
112. The imposition of liability according to such "market share" basis is not uncom-
mon. This often happens when a victim cannot identify the specific tortfeasor, but can
nevertheless identify the class of product that occasioned the injury. See, e.g., Sindell v.
Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (holding that manufacturers of the drug DES
should be held liable for a portion of the judgment equivalent to each manufacturer's
relative sales of the drug); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989) (adopt-
ing the market share theory for determining liability and apportioning damages in DES
drug cases where the manufacturer of the drug is impossible to identify). In the assess-
ment of liability in such cases, the defendants are held liable in proportion to their share
of market sales. Id. at 1076. This bears a close analogy to our hypothetical rule where the
harm is allocated between two parties on the basis of their respective shares of activity level.
113. Parisi & Fon, supra note 23, at 351.
114. Strassfeld, supra note 38, at 931.
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causal importance."1 1 5 As we have seen in the analysis above, courts
have adopted a mixed normative criterion of comparative causation,
mostly as a pragmatic and equitable tool, when they would otherwise
have been barred from utilizing extra-causal factors in the assessment
of liability (e.g., when apportioning liability under a strict liability
rule, etc.).
Some commentators endorse such mixed use, suggesting that the
mixed normative approach yields an imperfect but workable test that
allows us to apportion liability and state that one cause was more im-
portant than another. 1 6 Some courts and scholars take an expressly
normative approach by "evaluat[ing] causes and determin[ing] their
importance [with] extracausal criteria" (i.e., "value judgments about
merits and demerits of the actors, their conduct," etc.).11 While not
an adherent of this approach, Calabresi suggests that the use of causal
criteria in both fault-based and strict liability regimes may be a valua-
ble instrument for promoting economic efficiency.' 
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Needless to say, such a complex formulation of the rule would
require courts and juries to undertake an assessment of multiple vari-
ables with added administrative costs that may not be fully justified by
equitable considerations, or by the improved performance of the rule
on efficiency grounds. Furthermore, real-life applications of the com-
parative causation rule show that, most frequently, comparative causa-
tion is invoked because negligence rules are impracticable or because
neither party was found negligent in the case at bar. Giving considera-
tion to such extra-causal elements in the analysis of comparative causa-
tion would reintroduce, through the back door, the elements that
were excluded or found immaterial in the first place, defeating one of
the main functions of the alternative criterion of liability.
115. Id.
116. E.g., id. at 951.
117. Id. at 945-46.
118. Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr.,
43 U. CHI. L. REv. 69, 82-84, 108 (1975) (observing that there is an important relationship
between the causal tests (such as the traditional proximate cause requirement) and the
efficiency criterion of the cheapest cost avoider (i.e., the person who has the best knowl-
edge of the risks and the ways to avoid them and thus can take the least costly steps to avoid
the loss)). Calabresi further argues that the cause-in-fact requirement serves the economic
efficiency goal because it "is simply a useful way of toting up some of the costs the cheapest
cost avoider should face in deciding whether avoidance is worthwhile." Id. at 85.
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V. CONCLUSION: THE DILEMMA OF CAUSAL APPORTIONMENT OF
THE Loss
All bilateral precaution rules that we have encountered struggle
with a common dilemma. An increase in care level (or a reduction of
activity level) for one party makes an accident less likely to occur.
However, each party's precautions also make the accident less likely to
occur for the other party. There is no feasible and cost-effective mech-
anism in tort law to induce victims and tortfeasors to internalize the
benefits and costs of their behavior in all dimensions.
In spite of this common ontological problem, in this Article we
have shown an important qualitative difference between the rules that
apportion liability on the basis of negligence and those that apportion
liability on the basis of activity levels. Negligence-based rules can in-
duce optimal choices of care for both parties because of the existence
of a point of discontinuity in the liability function (which usually coin-
cides with the socially optimal level of care for both parties). When
the focus shifts to activity levels, there is no discontinuity, since theidentification of socially optimal activity levels requires information on
the private value of the activity for each party: a quite formidable find-
ing for a third-party decisionmaker. This explains the benefit of the
comparative causation approach, which combines the advantages of
the care-driven discontinuities while allowing a loss-sharing result in
equilibrium.
This further explains the historical emergence of comparative
causation rules, applied in conjunction with negligence and compara-
tive negligence standards. Such mixed application of the rule permits
loss sharing in equilibrium, without undermining the underlying in-
centives for optimal care. The comparative causation criterion avoids
the need to identify a critical value of care or activity level, as it im-poses no discontinuity in the liability faced by the parties. This in-
duces both parties to internalize a positive share of the social costs and
benefits of their care and activity level in equilibrium.
When combined with negligence standards, comparative causa-
tion incentives induce the parties to adopt efficient care levels and
close-to-efficient activity levels, without the need for a third-party deci-
sionmaker to investigate unobservable costs and benefits. This rule,
while an improvement to known liability rules with respect to at least
one of the four relevant margins, spreads the residual incentives to
control activity levels for both parties. The overall performance of the




These findings help us understand the historical evolution of the
comparative causation rule and the peculiar scope of application of
the rule in historical and contemporary legal systems. Different, but
converging, rationales seem to motivate the early applications of the
rule. Some of the applications of the comparative causation rule ap-
pear to be driven by loss-sharing considerations. Whenever it is desir-
able to spread the loss between the parties, such that the injurer and
the victim could truly expect to share the loss, comparative causation
may be a better legal instrument than comparative or contributory
negligence. Under comparative or contributory negligence, there is
only the threat of sharing damages between the parties. In equilib-
rium, however, sharing of loss never happens. Thus, comparative cau-
sation is more appealing when parties are highly risk-averse. Other
applications are driven by practical necessity or when the all-or-noth-
ing outcomes of a case are not politically or diplomatically viable, as in
the case of international responsibility of sovereign states. In other
cases, practical considerations are driven by the need to maintain effi-
cient incentives although fault-driven liability is not viable, as in the
case of the responsibility of incapable individuals. In all such cases,
although a social optimum cannot be obtained, the comparative cau-
sation rule allows the imposition of liability, inducing an equilibrium
that approximates in several dimensions the ideal, but unobtainable,
social optimum.
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